High advisory for praktor

Advisory overview

praktor is a multi-agent Claude Code orchestrator with Telegram input and output, Docker isolation, and a Mission Control UI. Prior to 0.9.1, both Telegram upload sites in `internal/telegram/bot.go` concatenate the attacker-controlled document filename into a destination path without sanitization, and `path.Join` collapses parent-directory traversal. A remote Telegram user who can message the bot can therefore write outside `uploads/` within the persistent agent workspace mounted at `/workspace/agent`. Because `allow_from: []` permits all senders by default, no prior authentication or privilege is required in that configuration. The attacker can plant or overwrite `CLAUDE.md`, instruction, skill, hook, or configuration files that the Claude agent reads and operates on across later runs, turning a document upload into stored instruction injection. The demonstrated arbitrary-write scope is the persistent agent workspace volume, not an unrestricted host-filesystem write. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.1.

Related references

• https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/commit/c3731eeda01c0b3ec1dbd13cccd5a147c3182141
• https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/pull/228
• https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/releases/tag/v0.9.1
• https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/security/advisories/GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99