GHSA-rvfr-cqwq-rc4j · @libp2p/crypto
GHSA-rvfr-cqwq-rc4j · Reported 17 Nov 2026
Full advisory details, affected packages, severity context, and original source.
Affected technology
Affected versions and fixes
Version information comes from OSV, NVD, and the CVE vendor record. Each source may describe a different package, release branch, or platform.
@libp2p/crypto · npm
OSV- All earlier versions · before 5.1.22 (exclusive)
Fixed releases / commits: 5.1.22
Advisory overview
### Summary A remote peer can stall a js-libp2p node's entire event loop for ~4–5 seconds per connection (and transiently allocate ~2 GB) by sending a ~15-byte crafted `publicKey` inside an Identify message. The malformed key reaches the DER decoder before any peer-id/signature check, so the attack is pre-auth and repeatable indefinitely by reconnecting. ### Details `packages/crypto/src/keys/rsa/der.ts` `readLength()` parses DER long-form lengths with no comparison to `buf.byteLength`, and `readInteger()` then loops over the attacker-claimed length: ```ts function readInteger (buf, context) { const length = readLength(buf, context) // attacker-controlled, claims up to 2^64 const end = context.offset + length for (let i = context.offset; i < end; i++) // runs far past buf.byteLength vals.push(buf[i]) // pushes `undefined` past the end } ``` The blob reaches the parser pre-auth: Identify runs on every `connection:open` and calls `publicKeyFromProtobuf(publicKey)` (`packages/protocol-identify/src/identify.ts:85`) before the `connection.remotePeer.equals(id)` check at `identify.ts:88`. The `MAX_RSA_JWK_SIZE` guard in `pkixToRSAPublicKey` only bounds the total blob size, not the inner length field, so a 15-byte payload defeats it; the ECDSA path (`unmarshalECDSAPublicKey`) has no cap at all. The decode runs in a single synchronous tick, so no `AbortSignal` — including Identify's 5 s timeout — can interrupt it. Verified on js-libp2p commit `a04f5e0`, where `@libp2p/crypto` reads `5.1.21`. ### PoC Full PoC attached (`libp2p-crypto-der-eventloop-dos-poc.tar.gz`). Build the js-libp2p monorepo at the affected version (`npm install --ignore-scripts && npm run build`), extract the package inside the monorepo root (sibling of `packages/`), then `cd libp2p-crypto-der-eventloop-dos-poc && node attack.mjs`. Expected: ``` [*] round 1: payload sent=true, victim event-loop stall = 4s, peak RSS ~1980 MB [*] round 2: payload sent=true, victim event-loop stall = 4-5s, peak RSS ~1980 MB [*] round 3: payload sent=true, victim event-loop stall = 4s, peak RSS ~1980 MB [!] Vulnerability reproduced: 3/3 connections each stalled the victim's event loop for ~4-5s — one crafted ~15-byte Identify publicKey per connection, pre-auth ``` The stall is measured from the victim's own 1 s heartbeat clock (frozen while the loop is blocked); the ~2 GB transient RSS peak is read from `/proc/<pid>/status`. The DER `RangeError` is swallowed by Identify's `.catch(() => {})`, so the node survives and every new connection re-stalls it; under a container memory limit the ~2 GB spike OOM-kills the process. A `node attack.mjs control` run (legitimate Identify) shows 0 s stalls. ### Impact CWE-130/CWE-400. Any node running the default Identify service is affected. A single peer can keep the node unresponsive to all of its peers (every new connection adds another multi-second stall — all timers, heartbeats, and protocol timeouts stop) and, in memory-constrained deployments, force an OOM kill. Suggested fix: in `readLength`, reject any long-form length whose value exceeds `buf.byteLength - context.offset`; in `readInteger`/`readObjectIdentifier`/`readBitString`/`readOctetString`, clamp or assert `end`/`finalOffset` against `buf.byteLength` before looping; add an overall DER-element-length sanity cap at `decodeDer` entry and a byte-length cap in `unmarshalECDSAPublicKey`. [libp2p-crypto-der-eventloop-dos-poc.tar.gz](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/30452369/libp2p-crypto-der-eventloop-dos-poc.tar.gz)
Also known as
CVE-2026-110789
