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OSV security advisoryHigh

GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv · chainguard.dev/sdk

GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv · Reported 18 Nov 2026

Full advisory details, affected packages, severity context, and original source.

Affected technology

chainguard.dev/sdkAffected product

Affected versions and fixes

Version information comes from OSV, NVD, and the CVE vendor record. Each source may describe a different package, release branch, or platform.

chainguard.dev/sdk · Go

OSV
  • All earlier versions · before 0.1.107 (exclusive)

Fixed releases / commits: 0.1.107

Advisory overview

### Summary The `auth/aws` package of the `chainguard.dev/sdk` Go library provides Chainguard's AWS-backed identity federation (an AWS workload proves its identity to Chainguard by signing an AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` request). Its verifier, `VerifyToken`, reads the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` binding headers from a presented token but does not require them to be covered by the SigV4 signature. AWS STS validates only the headers listed in `SignedHeaders` and ignores all others, so an attacker can take a `GetCallerIdentity` request that a victim signed for a *different* relying party, inject or rewrite those two headers *after* signing (without invalidating the signature), and replay it to any service that authenticates callers with `VerifyToken`. The binding those headers were meant to provide is therefore forgeable — a verifier-side (relying-party) authentication bypass / cross-service token replay. ### Background The package uses the standard "signed `GetCallerIdentity`" pattern — the same approach HashiCorp Vault's AWS auth method and Kubernetes `aws-iam-authenticator` use: the caller signs an AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` request with its AWS credentials to prove who it is, and presents that signed request as a bearer token. It has two halves: - `GenerateToken` (client): builds the `GetCallerIdentity` request, adds the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` headers that bind the proof to a specific Chainguard audience (issuer) and assumable identity, SigV4-signs it, and serializes it into a token. - `VerifyToken` (relying party): decodes the token, checks those two binding headers, forwards the request to AWS STS to confirm the caller's real AWS identity (ARN), and returns it so a Chainguard token can be issued for that identity. The binding headers exist so a proof minted for one audience/identity cannot be reused for another — a defense against cross-service replay — and their security depends entirely on being covered by the SigV4 signature. ### Impact A relying party calling `auth/aws.VerifyToken` can be induced to accept a `GetCallerIdentity` proof that a victim produced for an unrelated purpose — for example a request minted for HashiCorp Vault's AWS auth method, Kubernetes `aws-iam-authenticator`, a different audience, or one captured from logs or a proxy — and to treat it as proof of the victim's AWS identity for an attacker-chosen audience and identity. The signed request is valid within its ~15-minute window. No access to the victim's AWS credentials is required; the attacker only needs a fresh signed `GetCallerIdentity` request from the victim principal. Code that uses only `auth/aws.GenerateToken` (token generation) is not affected — the generator correctly includes the binding headers in the signature. Only verifiers using `auth/aws.VerifyToken` are affected. ### Affected versions All released versions of `chainguard.dev/sdk` that include `auth/aws.VerifyToken`, up to and including `v0.1.106`. ### Patches Fixed in `chainguard.dev/sdk` [v0.1.107](https://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk/releases/tag/v0.1.107). The fix requires both the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` headers to be present in the request's SigV4 `SignedHeaders` before their values are trusted (mirroring the mitigation HashiCorp Vault applies by requiring `X-Vault-AWS-IAM-Server-ID` to be signed). It additionally adds defense-in-depth checks on the request method, the STS host, and the request timestamp. Upgrade to v0.1.107 or later. ### Workarounds There is no client-side workaround; the fix is in the verifier. Operators of services that verify AWS-backed identities with `VerifyToken` should upgrade as soon as the patched release is available. ### References - AWS Signature Version 4 — signed headers: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_sigv.html - Comparable mitigation: HashiCorp Vault requires the `X-Vault-AWS-IAM-Server-ID` header to appear in `SignedHeaders` before trusting it. ### Credits Reported by Kris Kennaway (Datadog).

Also known as

CVE-2026-71861

Related references

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