GHSA-x2vm-cf3p-m2w8 · @libp2p/gossipsub
GHSA-x2vm-cf3p-m2w8 · Reported 17 Nov 2026
Full advisory details, affected packages, severity context, and original source.
Affected technology
Affected versions and fixes
Version information comes from OSV, NVD, and the CVE vendor record. Each source may describe a different package, release branch, or platform.
@libp2p/gossipsub · npm
OSV- All earlier versions · before 17.0.0 (exclusive)
Fixed releases / commits: 17.0.0
Advisory overview
### Summary A single gossipsub peer can grow a node's `topics` map without bound by flooding subscription RPCs, because the default configuration has no global, per-peer, or topic-length cap and peer scoring does not penalise subscription volume. The peer is never greylisted, so the growth continues toward OOM. ### Details `handleReceivedSubscription` (`packages/gossipsub/src/gossipsub.ts:1028`, line 1036) runs `this.topics.set(topic, new Set())` for every distinct topic string: ```ts private handleReceivedSubscription (from, topic, subscribe) { let topicSet = this.topics.get(topic) if (subscribe) { if (topicSet == null) { topicSet = new Set() this.topics.set(topic, topicSet) // no global cap, no per-peer cap } topicSet.add(from.toString()) } } ``` The only topical gate (`gossipsub.ts:981`, `if (this.allowedTopics != null && !this.allowedTopics.has(topic)) return`) is skipped when `allowedTopics` is null — the default. Subscriptions are unsigned RPC metadata (no signature needed); `decodeRpc`'s per-RPC limit caps count (`maxSubscriptions = 5000`) but not topic-string length or aggregate size; and the peer-scoring components P1–P7 have no subscription-volume term, so the attacker's score stays at 0 (above the `graylistThreshold` of −80) and `acceptFrom` keeps returning true. Verified on js-libp2p commit `a04f5e0`, where `@libp2p/gossipsub` reads `16.0.4`. ### PoC Full PoC attached (`gossipsub-topics-unbounded-growth-poc.tar.gz`). Build the js-libp2p monorepo at the affected version (`npm install --ignore-scripts && npm run build`), extract the package inside the monorepo root (sibling of `packages/`), then `cd gossipsub-topics-unbounded-growth-poc && node attack.mjs`. Expected (default config): ``` [*] sending 300 RPC frames x 4000 unique ~190-byte topic subscriptions (1,200,000 topics total) [*] progress: 88% sent | victim topics=1,032,000 rss=740MB peers=1 [*] victim quiesced: topics=~1,100,000 rss=~870MB peers=1 [!] Vulnerability reproduced: one connected peer grew the victim's gossipsub topics map to ~1.1M entries (RSS +~900MB) with 300 subscription RPCs — no global, per-peer, or topic-length cap in the default config ``` Control run (`ALLOWED_TOPICS=legit-topic`, i.e. `node attack.mjs control`): the identical flood is rejected at the `allowedTopics` gate and the topics map stays at 0 entries — confirming the vulnerable condition is the default `allowedTopics`-unset config. The map grows monotonically with no cap until the victim's own resource pressure trips; on disconnect `removePeer` performs an O(N) sweep over every topic entry (a secondary CPU cost) while the ~1 GB heap stays committed. ### Impact CWE-400/CWE-770. Every node running default gossipsub is affected; the attacker needs only one connection and is never rate-limited or greylisted. Growth continues toward OOM; on disconnect the O(N) `removePeer` sweep adds CPU cost. Suggested fix: bound by default (not opt-in) — a global cap on `topics.size`, a per-peer subscription cap with a P7 behaviour penalty so `acceptFrom` eventually greylists, a topic-string length cap at decode time, and/or flipping `allowedTopics` to deny-by-default; make `removePeer`'s topic iteration non-blocking/capped. [gossipsub-topics-unbounded-growth-poc.tar.gz](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/30452451/gossipsub-topics-unbounded-growth-poc.tar.gz)
Also known as
CVE-2026-119793
